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ONE PERSON, HOW MANY VOTES? MEASURING PRISON
MALAPPORTIONMENT
Ian Bollag-Miller*
“One-person, one-vote” is a fundamental principle of
democracy.
In practice, however, vote distribution among
population groups is often less than equal. Even in established
democracies, prison malapportionment—the distribution of
legislative seats by counting incarcerated people in their prisons’
districts rather than their home districts—is one example of a
practice that distorts voter representation.
Prison
malapportionment allows less populous districts that house prisons
to maximize their voting power at the expense of more densely
populated districts from which many incarcerated people previously
lived. While there has been significant scholarship on the causes
and effects of prison malapportionment, there is no standard method
for quantifying the level of distortion that results from the
phenomenon.
As such, no comparative study of prison
malapportionment exists in the international context.
This Article presents a method to measure
malapportionment that isolates the deviation from “one-person,
one-vote” that arises specifically from prison malapportionment.
This formula, “PMAL,” facilitates comparative analysis of prison
malapportionment among various jurisdictions. It also aids in
predicting and evaluating the success of reform efforts.
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INTRODUCTION
In Walker County, Texas, incarcerated individuals without
the right to vote represent 12 percent of the population in the state’s
thirteenth legislative district.1 This means that eighty-eight actual
residents of Walker County have the effective voting power of a
group of one-hundred voters residing in a legislative district without
a prison.2 This phenomenon is known as prison gerrymandering or
prison
malapportionment.3
Put
differently,
prison
malapportionment refers to the practice of counting incarcerated
individuals as residents of the district where their prison is located.
This practice increases the voting strength of their prison’s district
at the expense of the individual’s home district.4 Is this practice
fair? Is it necessary? Is it legal? If not, what can be done? Just
how serious and widespread is the problem?
Since the 2010 Census, prison malapportionment has come
under greater scrutiny in the United States.5 The resulting
scholarship and advocacy produced some legislative reforms at the
state level.6 But despite the growing conversation concerning prison
———————————————————————————
1

See Prison Gerrymandering Project, Fixing Prison-based Gerrymandering After
the
2020
Census:
Texas,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE,
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/50states/TX.html [https://perma.cc
/V7WK-PW4E] (last visited Oct. 20, 2022). For a general overview of the United
States’ “long history” of felon disenfranchisement, see One Person, No Vote: The
Laws of Felon Disenfranchisement, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1940 (2002).
2
See Prison Gerrymandering Project, supra note 1.
3
“Gerrymandering” and “malapportionment” are often used synonymously.
However, they are distinct in that gerrymandered districts can have equal
populations but disparate voting power, while malapportioned districts have equal
voting power but different population sizes. See Mitchell N. Berman, Managing
Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 785 (2005). A more detailed discussion
of the terminological distinction is provided. See infra Part I.A.
4
See Julie A. Ebenstein, The Geography of Mass Incarceration: Prison
Gerrymandering and the Dilution of Prisoners’ Political Representation, 45
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 324, 325 (2018).
5
See Nathaniel Persily, The Law of the Census: How to Count, What to Count,
Whom to Count, and Where to Count Them, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 755, 787-90
(2011) (predicting that the way the U.S. Census counts prisoners would be “the
subject of much debate surrounding the 2010 Census.”).
6
See, e.g., Janai Nelson, Counting Change: Ensuring an Inclusive Census for
Communities of Color, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1432 (2019) (finding that
“New York, California, Maryland, Delaware, and over 200” localities amended
their census practices to address the issue).
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malapportionment in the United States, there has not been a parallel
discussion of the phenomenon in other countries. Why not?
On one level, this disparity makes sense: the United States
is, by far, the nation with the largest incarcerated population, both
in terms of the total number of prisoners and prisoners per capita. 7
Yet, as of 2012, at least forty other countries restricted voting rights
of incarcerated individuals on some level.8 And, at least in theory,
many other countries with some level of prisoner
disenfranchisement—that use population data to apportion
legislative representation—should exhibit some level of prison
malapportionment.
Why, then, has the international and
comparative discussion been so limited?
This Article addresses a key gap in the existing scholarship
and policy debate: there is no widely utilized method for calculating
the level of prison malapportionment. In response to this deficiency,
this Article presents such a formula, which is adapted from a
generally accepted method to measure malapportionment. Such a
broadly applicable measure will allow for standardized comparative
studies. In turn, this Article’s proposed formula may help facilitate
discussion about the political, legal, and practical causes of, as well
as reform opportunities for, prison malapportionment.
Part I provides a general overview of malapportionment and
prison malapportionment. Specifically, Part I presents a brief
survey of the existing research in the context of the United States,
including a short discussion of enacted and proposed reform efforts.
Part II discusses common features of existing methods for
measuring general malapportionment. Part III then adapts one of
the malapportionment formulae to present the prison
malapportionment formula, PMAL. Additionally, Part III applies
the PMAL formula to a hypothetical example of a state with a
significant level of prison malapportionment. Lastly, this Article
offers general conclusions about the PMAL formula, suggests
potential applications, and identifies areas for future research.

———————————————————————————
7

See Statista Research Department, Countries with the Largest Number of
Prisoners per 100,000 of the National Population, as of May 2021, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/262962/countries-with-the-most-prisonersper-100-000-inhabitants [https://perma.cc/VR2D-B8FZ] (last visited Oct. 20,
2022) (prisoners per capita); Statista Research Department, Countries with the
Largest Number of Prisoners as of July 2021, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/262961/countries-with-the-most-prisoners
[https://perma.cc/FB9N-S25B] (last visited Oct. 20, 2022) (total number of
prisoners).
8
See International Comparison of Felon Voting Laws, PROCON.ORG,
https://felonvoting.procon.org/international-comparison-of-felon-voting-laws
[https://perma.cc/XX9T-5YHV] (last visited Oct. 20, 2022).
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I. MALAPPORTIONMENT AND PRISON MALAPPORTIONMENT
A. Malapportionment
The principle of “one-person, one-vote” has become a
central tenet of liberal democracy.9 In a system of universal
suffrage, the idea that each vote should count equally reflects a
fundamental notion of political equality and electoral fairness. In
one voting rights case, the U.S. Supreme Court opined as follows:
How then can one person be given twice or 10 times
the voting power of another person in a statewide
election merely because he lives in a rural area or
because he lives in the smallest rural county? Once
the geographical unit for which a representative is to
be chosen is designated, all who participate in the
election are to have an equal vote . . . [t]his is required
by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . [t]he idea that every voter is equal
to every other voter in his [s]tate, when he casts his
ballot in favor of one of several competing
candidates, underlies many of our decisions. 10
In reality, courts usually tolerate some level of deviation
from the one-person, one-vote principle.11 Some scholars have even
queried whether equal voting power is in fact an essential feature of
the democratic political tradition. 12 But while full equality of voting
power is unlikely in a multi-district, winner-take-all electoral
system,13 violations of the one-person, one-vote principle can, and
should, still be adjudicated at least “as a matter of math.”14
———————————————————————————
9

For a historical account of the transition of the concept of political representation
from a feudal landholder’s obligation to a principle of popular sovereignty, see
James A. Gardner, One Person, One Vote and the Possibility of Political
Community, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1237, 1244-51 (2002).
10
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963).
11
Indeed, Supreme Court precedent has “saddled the one person, one vote
doctrine with several vulnerabilities, including loose, uneven standards that apply
to different types of apportionment cases, insurmountable burdens of proof, and
equivocation about the Court’s own ability to adjudicate redistricting claims
because of the partisanship that permeates the redistricting process.” Stephanie
Cirkovich, Abandoning the Ten Percent Rule and Reclaiming One Person, One
Vote, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1823, 1825 (2010).
12
See, e.g., Alan L. Clem, Problems of Measuring and Achieving Equality of
Representation in State Legislatures, 42 NEB. L. REV. 622, 625-26 (1963).
13
See Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A
Case of the Emperor’s Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1595-96 (1993).
14
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2501 (2019). Notably, at least one
federal appeals court has declined to find an equal protection violation in a system

98

VOTING RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY FORUM

[Vol. 1

Deviation from the one-person, one-vote principle is called
malapportionment. In other words, malapportionment is the
unequal population distribution across voting districts with equal
voting power, creating a system where some lesser populated
districts significantly influence electoral outcomes more than other
more populous districts.15
The term malapportionment is related to and often used
interchangeably with gerrymandering. Gerrymandering is the
“practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts,
often of highly irregular shape.”16 The focus of gerrymandering, as
opposed to malapportionment, is usually on the effects of drawing
irregular territorial boundaries of electoral districts—rather than
counting individuals within a district.17 Both concepts concern
deviation from the one-person, one-vote principle. As such, they
usually involve the same legal and political criticisms and
justifications. But because this Article’s focus is on population
distribution—rather than territorial demarcation—the term
malapportionment is generally favored over gerrymandering.
Modern democracies generally disfavor unequal vote
distribution. In the United States, the majority view of this
phenomenon considers it antidemocratic.18
From former
Republican President Ronald Reagan to former Democratic
President Barack Obama, prominent politicians across the political
spectrum have condemned the practice. 19
It is important to note, however, that not all unequal voting
power results from political ill-will. For example, when it comes to
———————————————————————————
with prison malapportionment. See Davidson v. City of Cranston, 837 F.3d 135,
137 (1st Cir. 2016) (holding that the City of Cranston, Rhode Island did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause by counting prisoners as residents of one of the City’s
six wards).
15
See Berman, supra note 3, at 785.
16
Gerrymandering, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
17
One familiar example is North Carolina’s oddly shaped twelfth congressional
district, which “snake[s] over 160 miles across the state from Charlotte to Durham
to join together as many Black voters as possible.” Mac Brower, Gerrymandering
Deep Dive:
North Carolina, DEMOCRACY DOCKET (Sept. 28, 2021),
https://www.democracydocket.com/news/gerrymandering-deep-dive-northcarolina [https://perma.cc/L9FJ-2FKL].
18
See, e.g., Dan Balz, Gerrymandering is the Root of All Evil. Or is It?, WASH.
POST (Jan. 29, 2018, 2:23 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics
/gerrymandering-is-the-root-of-all-political-evil-or-is-it/2018/01/27/c12af98a02e9-11e8-9d31-d72cf78dbeee_story.html [https://perma.cc/MBH7-39GB]
(“Partisan gerrymandering is often seen as the root of much of what is wrong with
current politics[;] . . . [m]ost Americans recoil at the contorted shape of some
districts and see malevolent hands at work.”).
19
See Americans are United Against Partisan Gerrymandering, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST. (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/researchreports/americans-are-united-against-partisan-gerrymandering [https://perma.cc
/JL82-YQNJ].
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malapportionment—though not gerrymandering—the relative
voting strength of districts can change because of natural population
shifts.20
Of course, districts can also be intentionally
malapportioned to decrease the voting influence of historically
marginalized populations. 21 However generated, malapportionment
should be seriously scrutinized because of its impact on the
representativeness of the democratic system.22
B. Prison Malapportionment
Prison malapportionment, in particular, directly influences
how representative a democratic system functions in practice. In the
United States, the Census Bureau ordinarily compiles its residency
data using the “usual residence rule,” which counts where
individuals live and sleep most of the time. 23 This rule counts
individuals living in group arrangements like military barracks,
dormitories, and prisons as residing in such facilities.24 States then
rely on this data to draw their electoral districts. Thus, unless
specific statutes provide otherwise, states count incarcerated people
as residents of their prison’s district—rather than their home
district.25
The beneficiaries of this application of the usual residence
rule are almost universally rural, white, and conservative districts. 26
By contrast, those most harmed by prison malapportionment tend to
be densely-populated urban districts with larger minority
———————————————————————————
20

See, e.g., William S. Bailey, Reducing Malapportionment in Japan’s Electoral
Districts: The Supreme Court Must Act, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 169, 174 (1997)
(discussing Tokyo’s rapid population growth after the Second World War and its
impact on voting weight disparities).
21
See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (rejecting an attempt to create a
Black-majority legislative district to ensure the election of at least two Black
representatives); United Jewish Orgs of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144, 161 (1977) (rejecting the proposition that “racial criteria may never be used
in redistricting or that they may be used, if at all, only as a specific remedy for
past unconstitutional apportionments.”).
22
See Dale E. Ho, Captive Constituents: Prison-Based Gerrymandering and the
Current Redistricting Cycle, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 355, 359-60 (2011).
23
See id. at 359.
24
See id. (citing Pub. L. No. 94-171, 89 Stat. 1023).
25
See id. at 359.
26
See Michael Skocpol, Note, The Emerging Constitutional Law of Prison
Gerrymandering. 69 STAN. L. REV. 1473, 1476 (2017). Some states, however,
have enacted legislative reforms to count incarcerated people at their home
addresses—including in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois,
Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Virginia, and Washington. See Prison
Gerrymandering Project, supra note 1. For a list of enacted legislation at the state
level, see Prison Gerrymandering Project, Legislation, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE,
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/legislation.html [https://perma.cc/4YTL
2DG6] (last visited Oct. 20, 2022).
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populations.27 Resources tend to be diverted away from alreadyunderfunded neighborhoods of Black and Latinx communities and
given to these malapportioned districts.28 The result is a selfperpetuating cycle of poverty, which often leads to increased
criminality; in this regard, prison malapportionment is itself a
“physical manifestation of mass incarceration.” 29
Moreover, many public officials admit they do not view
incarcerated individuals, many of whom are originally from other
districts, as constituents.30 For example, one Colorado countywide
commissioner remarked that the incarcerated people in his district
“can’t vote; and if they complain forever there’s a good chance I
will never hear about it; there is a reason why they are in there, a
reason why they don’t vote, a reason why they don’t pay taxes.” 31
Two other representatives of districts with large prison populations
in New York and Florida explained that even when they do hear
from incarcerated individuals, their real attention is directed to the
corrections workers with whom they have strong relationships.32 In
Waupun, Wisconsin, where one-in-four people are incarcerated, the
elected officials who represent two majority-incarcerated districts
reported that they have never visited the prisons in their districts. 33
Nevertheless, elected officials who represent districts with
high levels of prison populations rely on these over-counted, underrepresented incarcerated “residents” for their political power. At the
same time, they are unaccountable to those who are incarcerated,
and are more likely to support policies that sustain or increase mass
incarceration.34

———————————————————————————
See, e.g., Jonathan Lai, How ‘Prison Gerrymandering’ Shifts Political Power
from Urban Pennsylvanians of Color to White, Rural Ones, PHILA. INQUIRER
(July 11, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/politics/pennsylvania/prisongerrymandering-pa-2021-redistricting-census-20190725.html [https://perma.cc
/C8YP-MJQW].
28
See Nelson, supra note 6, at 1429-30.
29
Molly Danahy & Danielle Lang, Distortion in the Census: America’s Oldest
Gerrymanderer?, 49 U. MEM. L. REV. 1065, 1076 (2019).
30
See John C. Drake, Note, Locked Up and Counted Out: Bringing an End to
Prison-based Gerrymandering, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 237, 260 (2011).
31
Jonathan Tilove, Minority Prison Inmates Skew Local Populations as States
Redistrict, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 12, 2002), http://www.prisonpolicy
.org/news/newhousenews031202.html [https://perma.cc/85NY-TFEV].
32
See id.
33
See Hansi Lo Wang & Kumari Devarajan, ‘Your Body Being Used’: Where
Prisoners Who Can’t Vote Fill Voting Districts, NAT’L PUB. RADIO: CODE
SWITCH (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2019/12/31
/761932806/your-body-being-used-where-prisoners-who-can-t-vote-fill-votingdistricts [https://perma.cc/D94R-F7N4].
34
See Drake, supra note 30, at 260.
27

2022]

ONE PERSON, HOW MANY VOTES?

101

Fortunately, public support for reform to end prison
malapportionment is on the rise. 35 Several states have considered or
enacted
reforms
to
eliminate
or
minimize
prison
36
malapportionment.
The leading reform proposition is to count
incarcerated people based on their residence prior to incarceration,
rather than the district in which they are held.37 This proposal has
considerable support: many state constitutions define residency in
a way that would exclude prisons.38 To date, at least four states and
over 200 localities have enacted reforms to this effect. 39 Another
proposal considers incarcerated people as having no address, thus
excluding them from any count.40 Still another would simply restore
incarcerated individuals’ right to vote.41
Although the Census Bureau elected not to adapt the usual
residence rule as it applies to incarcerated populations in the 2020
Census, the Bureau did receive over 77,000 public comments in
support of the reform.42 These comments included the following
proposals: (1) counting only prisoners serving long-term sentences
at the place of incarceration; (2) counting prisoners at their preincarceration home address; and (3) an ad hoc approach considering
the circumstances of individual prisoners.43 As efforts to reform
prison malapportionment continues, a common method for tracking
their effectiveness would be highly beneficial.

———————————————————————————
35

Garret Fisher et al., Prison Gerrymandering Undermines Our Democracy,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 22, 2021), http://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/research-reports/prison-gerrymandering-undermines-our-democracy
[https://perma.cc/Z23J-TU7Z].
36
See Prison Gerrymandering Project, supra note 1.
37
See Rebecca Harrison Stevens et al., Handcuffing the Vote: Diluting Minority
Voting Power Through Prison Gerrymandering and Felon Disenfranchisement,
21 ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 195, 203 (2019).
38
See Ho, supra note 22, at 364 (surveying state legislation and constitutional
provisions defining “residence”).
39
See Nelson, supra note 6, at 1432.
40
Peter Wagner, Exec. Dir., Prison Pol’y Initiative, Testimony before the Arizona
Redistricting Comm’n (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/
testimony/Wagner_AZ_10-25-2011.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2022).
41
Sanya Mansoor & Madeleine Carlisle, When Your Body Counts but Your Vote
Does Not: How Prison Gerrymandering Distorts Political Representation, TIME
(July 1, 2021, 3:19 PM), https://time.com/6077245/prison-gerrymanderingpolitical-representation [https://perma.cc/W9VV-GTWA].
42
Final 2020 Census Residence Criteria and Residence Situations, 83 Fed. Reg.
5527 (Feb. 8, 2018) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. ch. 1).
43
See id.
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II. MEASURING MALAPPORTIONMENT
A. Existing Malapportionment Measurement Methods
Political scientists have proposed and debated measurements
for legislative malapportionment for at least the last half-century.44
A basic feature of most malapportionment measurements is the
comparison of an existing apportionment arrangement (i.e., the
status quo) to an ideal apportionment arrangement.45 This is an
application of the Lorenz curve, a graphical principle developed
originally for the field of economics to illustrate income inequality
and wealth distribution.46 Such methods vary, of course, in how
they define both the status quo and the ideal apportionment
arrangement they envision.
For example, a measure might compare the
malapportionment of a district to the average level of
malapportionment for all districts in the system—using the system’s
average malapportionment level as the ideal.47 Another might
measure the deviation of the status quo arrangement from a system
of “perfect” apportionment, or the one-person, one-vote ideal.48
Still another might measure how close to 50 percent of the popular
vote is required to elect 50 percent of the system’s legislature. 49
Other measurements might define the status quo as an individual
district’s population,50 or by creating groups with a certain
population characteristic—like rural versus urban—to measure the
relative voting power of each subgroup. 51
For present purposes, the essential feature of any
malapportionment measure is that it compares a defined status quo
apportionment arrangement to a defined ideal apportionment
arrangement.
———————————————————————————
44

See generally Glendon Schubert & Charles Press, Measuring
Malapportionment, 58 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 302 (1964).
45
See, e.g., Olivier de Mouzon et al., One Man, One Vote Part 2: Measurement
of Malapportionment and Disproportionality and the Lorenz Curve (Toulouse
Sch. of Econs., Working Paper No. 20-1089, 2022), https://ideas.repec.org/p/tse
/wpaper/124204.html [https://perma.cc/M8GN-NNPS] (last visited Oct. 20,
2022).
46
See Thitethep Sitthiyot & Kanyarat Holasut, A Simple Method for Estimating
the Lorenz Curve, 8 HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. COMMC’NS, at 2-3 (2021).
47
See Clem, supra note 12, at 628.
48
Id. at 628-29.
49
Id. at 629 (citing Manning J. Dauer & Robert G. Kelsay, Unrepresentative
States, 44 NAT’L MUNIC. REV. 571-75 (1955)).
50
Id. at 629-30. This is the method employed by Justices Clark and Harlan in
Baker vs. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
51
See Clem, supra note 12, at 629 (citing PAUL T. DAVID & RALPH EISENBERG,
DEVALUATION OF THE URBAN AND SUBURBAN VOTE: A STATISTICAL
INVESTIGATION OF LONG-TERM TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATIVE
REPRESENTATION (1961)).
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B. MAL
In the early 2000s, political scientists David Samuels and
Richard Snyder observed that despite the rapid spread of democracy
in the last few decades of the twentieth century, there remained a
dearth of quantitative analysis examining the implementation of
representative democracy.52
In particular, they found that
scholarship lacked meaningful ways to evaluate the levels of
malapportionment in the newly established democracies.53
To fill the gap, Samuels and Snyder sought to conduct the
first “cross-national, comparative study” of malapportionment in
electoral systems. 54 To do so, they created a simple but effective
formula to calculate malapportionment: the MAL formula.55 The
first step in the MAL formula takes “the absolute value of the
difference between each district’s seat and population shares.”56
The number of values produced in this first step corresponds to the
number of districts in the electoral system at issue. The second step
adds all of the absolute values together and divides that total by two.
The result, the MAL value, represents the electoral system’s
deviation from perfect apportionment. Expressed in mathematical
terms, the formula is:
MAL = 1/2 ∑|𝑠𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖 |
Here, sigma (Σ) represents the sum of all districts (𝑖); (𝑠𝑖 ) represents
the percentage of the total seats allocated to the district; and (𝑣𝑖 )
represents the district’s percentage of the electorate’s total
population.57 Using the formula’s variables, the MAL number is
calculated in the following way:
1. Calculate the absolute value of the difference
between each district’s share of the total available
seats (𝑠𝑖 ) and its share of the total population (𝑣𝑖 );

———————————————————————————
52

David Samuels & Richard Snyder, The Value of a Vote: Malapportionment in
Comparative Perspective, 31 B.J. POL. S. 651, 651-52 (2001).
53
Id.
54
Id. However, Samuels and Snyder did note the plethora of existing literature
exploring apportionment in the United States. Id. at 653 n.8.
55
See id. at 655.
56
Id.
57
In their description of the formula, Samuels and Snyder would permit either the
use of the district’s total population or the total number of registered voters in the
district. Id. Because Part II.C accounts for incarcerated individuals without the
right to vote, this Article favors the use of total population, not registered voters.
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2. Total the absolute values of the differences
between share of seats and share of population (Σ);
and
3. Divide the total by two.
In a perfectly apportioned system, the sum of the absolute
value of 𝑠𝑖 - 𝑣𝑖 would be zero because each district’s share of the
available seats would be exactly equal to its share of the total
population. By calculating the absolute value, the formula measures
the entire electoral system’s deviation from perfect apportionment.
The MAL formula, therefore, creates a straightforward, easily
replicable process for quantifying a system’s total deviation from
the one-person, one-vote ideal.58
Lastly, it is important to note that calculating
malapportionment in single-tier electoral systems—like the United
States—is straightforward.59 By contrast, multi-tier systems—such
as in Germany, Mexico, or Japan—are “more complex because
territorial units are allocated seats on different bases according to
the rules for each tier.”60
C. PMAL
With slight modifications, the MAL formula can be adapted
to measure specific types of malapportionment—such as prison
malapportionment. For example, where an initial MAL value
counts disenfranchised incarcerated individuals in their prison’s
district, an adjusted MAL value can be calculated to count
incarcerated persons in their home districts. These two values (the
initial and adjusted MAL values) can be compared to measure the
distortion in voting power that results from prison
malapportionment. Recalling the previous discussion of common
features of malapportionment measurements, 61 the initial MAL is
the status quo, and the adjusted MAL is the ideal apportionment
———————————————————————————
58

Samuels and Snyder used this formula to calculate the malapportionment levels
in a seventy-eight-country sample. Id. at 659-62.
59
Specifically, a single-tier electoral system is one where each voter votes once
and there is one set of elected representatives. See Electoral System Tiers and
Hybrid Systems, ACE ELECTORAL KNOWLEDGE NETWORK, https://aceproject.org
/ace-en/topics/es/esd/esd05 [https://perma.cc/4BB3-Y3K9] (last visited Oct. 20,
2022). Samuels and Snyder note that in single-tier systems, “all electoral districts
are primary, that is, they cannot be divided into smaller districts to which seats
are allocated.” Samuels & Snyder, supra note 52, at 656 n.16. By comparison,
multi-tier systems have secondary districts that can be divided into two or more
primary districts. Id.
60
Id.
61
See supra Part I.A.
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arrangement. The resulting measure of distortion is the PMAL
value. In mathematical terms, 62 the formula is:
PMAL = |initial MAL − adjusted MAL|
Employing the formula is as follows:
1. The initial MAL value is calculated exactly as
described in Part II.B.
2. The prison population of each district is then
reallocated. For a reform that counts incarcerated
individuals as residents of their home districts, the
prison population is redistributed accordingly.63 To
evaluate the effect of removing incarcerated people
from the count entirely, the prison population would
simply be subtracted from the initial population used
in the MAL calculation. This is a manipulation of
the initial MAL’s 𝑣𝑖 variable to account for the
reallocation resulting from counting the prison
population. For the adjusted MAL, this is expressed
as 𝑧𝑖 .
3. The adjusted MAL value is then calculated in the
same manner as the initial MAL, with the
substitution of 𝑧𝑖 for 𝑣𝑖 . The formula for the adjusted
MAL value is therefore: MAL = 1/2 ∑|si − zi |
4. The absolute value of initial MAL minus
adjusted MAL is taken, producing the value of the
PMAL value for that system.
D. Hypothetical: PMAL in Practice
1. Freedonia
Consider this hypothetical to illustrate the application of the
PMAL formula to determine the level of prison malapportionment
in the fictional country of Freedonia. Suppose Freedonia has a
single-chamber legislature with 100 members. There are four states
in Freedonia: Appleville, Bananaberg, Cherryton, and Dateford.
———————————————————————————
62

Expressed in complete and unreduced terms, the formula is:
PMAL = |(1/2 ∑|𝑠𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖 |) − (1/2 ∑|𝑠𝑖 − 𝑧𝑖 |)|.
63
In effect, this would reduce the population of the prison’s district, and increase
the population of the incarcerated persons’ home districts, thereby reducing the
level of malapportionment.
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Freedonia’s most populous city is in Dateford, the country’s
smallest state by area. There are two prisons in Freedonia: (1)
Figbury Prison, located in Appleville, which houses 2,000
incarcerated individuals; and (2) Grapeham Prison, located in
Bananaberg, which houses another 1,000. Assume both are at full
capacity. In Freedonia, incarcerated individuals cannot vote. In its
census, Freedonia follows the usual residence rule and counts
incarcerated individuals where they sleep most of the time. 64
Table 1 below reflects the populations of the states of
Freedonia, the number of legislative seats they elect in the
Freedonian legislature, and the relative shares of each:
Table 1: Freedonia Population and Seat Share by State
Percentage of
Seats in
Population
Legislature

Percentage
of Seats

State

Population

Appleville

10,000

10%

10

10%

Bananaberg

20,000

20%

20

20%

Cherryton

30,000

30%

30

30%

Dateford

40,000

40%

40

40%

2. MAL Application: Freedonia
Is Freedonia’s electoral system malapportioned? Using the
figures in Table 1, the MAL value for Freedonia is calculated as
follows:
(1) Calculate the absolute value of the difference
between each district’s allocated seats and its share
of the total population of the country.
Appleville: | 10 – 10 | = 0
Bananaberg: |20 – 20 | = 0
Cherryton: | 30 – 30 | = 0
Dateford: | 40 – 40 | = 0

———————————————————————————
64

See Ho, supra note 22, at 359 (explaining the application of the usual residence
rule in the U.S. Census).
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(2) Total the absolute values of the differences
between states and total population for each district.
0+0+0+0=0
(3) Divide the total by two.
0/2=0
Thus, according to the MAL formula, Freedonia appears to
be a perfectly apportioned system; its MAL value is 0.
3. PMAL Application: Freedonia
Now, consider the impact of
malapportionment, using Table 2 below.

Freedonia’s

prison

Table 2: Freedonia Prison Populations
Prison

Prison
Population

Figbury Prison
(Appleville)

2,000

Grapeham Prison
(Bananaberg)

1,000

Home States of
Prison Population
Dateford: 1,500
Cherryton: 400
Appleville: 100
Dateford: 500
Cherryton: 300
Bananaberg: 200

If Freedonia’s population of incarcerated individuals is
reallocated so that those individuals count in their home districts, the
share of relative seats and population for each state is as follows:
Table 3: Freedonia Post-Reallocation Population Share by State
State

Population

Percentage of
Population

Appleville

8,100 (-1,900)

8.1%

Bananaberg

19,200 (-800)

19.2%

Cherryton

30,700 (+700)

30.7%

Dateford

42,000 (+1,700)

42%
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The adjusted MAL value is calculated using the population
figures from Table 3 and the seat share figures from Table 1.
(1) Calculate the absolute value of the difference
between each district’s allocated seats and its share
of the total country population. 65
Appleville: | 10 – 8.1 | = 1.9
Bananaberg: |20 – 19.2 | = 0.8
Cherryton: | 30 – 30.7 | = 0.7
Dateford: | 40 – 41.7 | = .02
(2) Total the absolute values of the differences
between states and total population for each district.
1.9 + 0.8 + 0.7 + 2.0 = 5.4
(3) Divide the total by two. This is the adjusted
MAL.
5.4 / 2 = 2.7
(4) Finally, calculate the PMAL.
| 0 – 2.7 | = 2.7
4. Observations About Freedonia’s PMAL
Understandably, it is easy to misconceive Freedonia as
perfectly apportioned.
Indeed, according to the traditional
definition, it is—a malapportionment figure of zero signifies a
perfectly apportioned system. 66 Here, however, it is important to
observe that many politicians do not purport to represent their prison
populations in the same way they do their non-incarcerated
constituents.67 Can an electoral system be perfectly apportioned—
or even democratic—if its electoral representatives do not consider
themselves as representing a meaningful portion of their district’s
population? The first step in exploring this question, and others like
it, is to understand just how distorted the representation is.
Though obviously an oversimplification, the Freedonian
example reflects some of the common features of prison
malapportionment. For example, its most populous state (Dateford)
———————————————————————————
65

An absolute value is always displayed as positive (or zero) because it is a
measurement of the distance between two real numbers.
66
Samuels & Snyder, supra note 52, at 667.
67
See Drake, supra note 30, at 260.
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sends many Datefordians to prisons in other less-populous rural
states.68 As a result, the states of Appleville and Dateford have the
most significant deviations from perfect apportionment. Notably,
this is consistent with the general prison malapportionment trend of
benefiting rural, less-populated districts at the expense of densely
populated, urbanized districts. 69
III. CONCLUSIONS
A. Limitations
A few key assumptions and limitations of the foregoing
example and the PMAL formula should be noted. First, the PMAL
formula as presented in this Article only works in a single-tier
electoral system—like the United States.70 Second, it assumes that
all incarcerated individuals are completely disenfranchised,
regardless of the crime for which they were convicted.71 To study
systems where only certain convictions result in the removal of an
incarcerated individual’s right to vote, the post-adjustment
population share variable (𝑧𝑖 ) would need to be altered accordingly.
And third, the formula requires information about incarcerated
people that may not be easily accessible.
For example,
confidentiality issues or poor record-keeping may be serious barriers
to obtaining the necessary information to reallocate incarcerated
individuals to their home districts.
B. Benefits and Potential Applications of PMAL
Snyder and Samuels observed a lack of international
comparative scholarship of malapportionment—despite an
established body of research in the United States.72 In the prison
malapportionment context, there is a similar wealth of U.S.-focused
———————————————————————————
68

See Persily, supra note 5, at 788-89 (explaining that most inmates are displaced
from urban communities and incarcerated in prisons in rural areas).
69
Id. at 788 (stating that in twenty-one counties in the U.S., over 20 percent of the
population is in prison).
70
See Samuels & Snyder, supra note 52, at 656-57 (discussing MAL in the context
of multi-tiered electoral systems—such as those in Germany, Mexico, and Japan).
See also supra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.-Error! Bookmark not
defined. and accompanying text.
71
Even in the United States, the extent of prisoner disenfranchisement varies as a
matter of state law. See 10 A.L.R.6th 31 (2006). As a practical matter, however,
in the United States, even individuals convicted of misdemeanors and pre-trial
detainees, who have not formally lost the right to vote, are almost entirely
disenfranchised during the extent of their incarceration. See Robin Fisher,
Comment, Ballot Access Behind Bars, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. ONLINE 86, 88-93
(2020).
72
Samuels & Snyder, supra note 52, at 652-53.
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scholarship and dearth of comparative study. In the same way that
the MAL formula facilitated subsequent quantitative research on the
levels of malapportionment throughout the world, 73 PMAL can help
promote further research on prison malapportionment.
First, the simplicity of the PMAL formula is important.
While certain statistical concepts like chi-squares and standard
deviations are relatively comprehensible by those without a
background in statistics, 74 the accessibility of the field may
legitimately be questioned when it comes to concepts like inverse
coefficients of variation, skewness, and kurtosis. Regardless of an
individual’s familiarity with statistical analysis, a simple, effective
formula has great benefits. It can reduce the burden of a large-scale
study like those conducted by Snyder and Samuels—which is
especially useful in a comparative study.
Furthermore, in the same way that the MAL formula was
adapted to measure prison malapportionment, the PMAL formula
can be adapted to isolate any number of other types of
malapportionment. If a single variable can be isolated (in the PMAL
formula, population share), a comparison between an initial
malapportionment level and the subsequent level of
malapportionment after the variable is adapted will demonstrate the
level of deviation attributable to that specific issue.
The PMAL formula can also be applied to predict the effects
of various potential reform efforts. The Freedonia hypothetical, for
example, explored the proposal of reallocating incarcerated
individuals to their home districts for the purpose of seat allocation.
Furthermore, the PMAL measure could also be used to explore the
effect of not counting incarcerated people (i.e., removing them from
the pre-adjustment population share) or restoring their right to vote
(i.e., adding these individuals to the pre-adjustment share for the
district of the prison).
Finally, research using the PMAL formula can assist in
public education and policy advocacy about the serious issue of
prison malapportionment. Understanding the scope of a problem is
the first step in solving it. Grounding the discourse around prison
malapportionment in a comprehensible and quantifiable measure
can help ensure all participants are speaking the same language.

———————————————————————————
73

See, e.g., Richard Snyder & David J. Samuels, Legislative Malapportionment
in Latin America, Historical and Comparative Perspectives, in 4 FEDERALISM AND
DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA (Edward L. Gibson, ed.) (2004) (implementing
the MAL formula for a comparative study of legislative malapportionment in
Latin America).
74
Schubert & Press, supra note 44, at 311-12.

